The CMA’s assessment of customer detriment in the UK retail energy market by Littlechild, S.
                                                               





Cambridge Working Papers in Economics: 2051 
 
THE CMA’S ASSESSMENT OF CUSTOMER DETRIMENT IN THE UK 







2 June 2020 
 
In 2016, the UK Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) found that “weak customer response” 
enabled incumbent UK energy retailers to set higher and discriminatory prices to residential customers. 
The CMA estimated the associated higher prices constituted a customer detriment in the range £1.4 bn to 
£2 bn per year. Although the CMA recommended against a price cap on most domestic energy tariffs, the 
size of the detriment and public concern about “rip-off energy tariffs” nonetheless led the Government to 
impose a price cap as from January 2019. This paper examines the CMA’s calculation of customer 
detriment and suggests that it is inconsistent with CMA Guidelines and unprecedented with respect to its 
nature, magnitude and policy impact. Alternative more realistic calculations suggest that any detriment 
would have been nearly an order of magnitude lower, so that a price cap was inappropriate. This raises a 
number of questions about the CMA’s approach. 
Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 
 






The CMA’s assessment of customer detriment 
in the UK retail energy market 
 
EPRG Working Paper      2015 




Abstract  In 2016, the UK Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) found 
that “weak customer response” enabled incumbent UK energy retailers to set higher and 
discriminatory prices to residential customers. The CMA estimated the associated higher 
prices constituted a customer detriment in the range £1.4 bn to £2 bn per year. Although the 
CMA recommended against a price cap on most domestic energy tariffs, the size of the 
detriment and public concern about “rip-off energy tariffs” nonetheless led the Government 
to impose a price cap as from January 2019. This paper examines the CMA’s calculation of 
customer detriment and suggests that it is inconsistent with CMA Guidelines and 
unprecedented with respect to its nature, magnitude and policy impact. Alternative more 
realistic calculations suggest that any detriment would have been nearly an order of 
magnitude lower, so that a price cap was inappropriate. This raises a number of questions 
about the CMA’s approach. 
 
Keywords  retail energy markets, market power, efficient costs 
 
JEL Classification L94, L95, L51   
 
Contact sclittlechild@tanworth.mercianet.co.uk 
Publication  June 2020 
1 
 
The CMA’s assessment of customer detriment in the UK retail energy market 
Stephen Littlechild1 
28 May 2020 
Abstract 
In 2016, the UK Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) found that “weak customer response” 
enabled incumbent UK energy retailers to set higher and discriminatory prices to residential 
customers. The CMA estimated the associated higher prices constituted a customer detriment in 
the range £1.4 bn to £2 bn per year. Although the CMA recommended against a price cap on most 
domestic energy tariffs, the size of the detriment and public concern about “rip-off energy tariffs” 
nonetheless led the Government to impose a price cap as from January 2019. This paper examines 
the CMA’s calculation of customer detriment and suggests that it is inconsistent with CMA 
Guidelines and unprecedented with respect to its nature, magnitude and policy impact. Alternative 
more realistic calculations suggest that any detriment would have been nearly an order of 
magnitude lower, so that a price cap was inappropriate. This raises a number of questions about 
the CMA’s approach. 
1. Introduction 
Following concerns about rising energy prices and about its own regulatory policy, the Office of 
Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) in 2014 asked the Competition and Markets Authority 
(CMA) to review the UK energy market.2 It specified five issues for particular examination, 
including “weak customer response”. In its Final Report, the CMA (2016) found “an overarching 
feature of weak customer response” in the domestic (i.e. residential) retail market which had an 
“adverse effect on competition”. This gave market power to the six large former-incumbent 
suppliers, enabling them to engage in price discrimination against less engaged customers 
(elsewhere called a “two-tier market” or a “loyalty penalty”) and to make excess profits and/or to 
operate inefficiently.  
The CMA’s “preferred estimate” of customer detriment in the form of higher prices was an average 
of £1.4 bn per year over 2012-2015, rising to almost £2 bn in 2015 (where £1 = US$1.33 in June 
2016). On average, £1.4 bn represented 9% of the bill of a dual fuel customer. The CMA 
considered but rejected the remedy of a widespread price cap, and recommended instead that 
Ofgem should experiment with different ways of promoting greater customer engagement and 
switching. However, in a note of dissent, one member of the CMA panel recommended in addition 
 
1 Emeritus Professor, University of Birmingham, and Fellow, Cambridge Judge Business School. This is a further 
revision and reorientation of an earlier paper (Littlechild 2017a, 2018a). I am grateful to Monica Giulietti, Eileen 
Marshall, Bruce Mountain, Robert Ritz, Tim Tutton, Catherine Waddams and several industry colleagues for helpful 
comments, and especially to two patient referees for pointing out an earlier error, challenging the argument, suggesting 
improvements, and demanding more clarity. 
2 Strictly speaking, the policy and the present paper refer to Great Britain (that is, the UK excluding Northern Ireland) 
but the term UK is more familiar internationally. 
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a temporary widespread price cap because of the size of the customer detriment and the limited 
effectiveness to date of measures to promote customer engagement. 
After considerable political debate, often citing the magnitude of this detriment, in July 2018 the 
Tariff Cap Act required Ofgem to impose a cap on most domestic energy tariffs. Meanwhile, the 
CMA has since found “loyalty penalties” of £4 bn in other consumer markets and proposed various 
interventions there including the possibility of price controls. 
Several aspects of the CMA report and methodology have been critically appraised by the present 
author and others.3 Given the impact that the CMA’s calculation of customer detriment has had on 
policy, the present paper seeks to better understand and appraise that calculation, in the context of 
previous investigations by UK competition authorities.  
Section 2 looks at how previous UK competition authority investigations of other markets, 
particularly the cement market, have used two different approaches (which the CMA called ‘direct’ 
and ‘indirect’) to estimate customer detriment. Section 3 examines the CMA’s preferred so-called 
‘direct approach’, involving the characterisation of a ‘well-functioning retail energy market’ that 
it used as a benchmark against which it calculated customer detriment. The paper argues that the 
CMA’s benchmark was a long-run equilibrium concept inconsistent with the CMA’s own 
Guidelines, quite different from the method used earlier to calculate detriment in the cement 
market; it was also based on unrealistic assumptions. Section 4 explores some arguably more 
realistic assumptions about customer response and the costs and capacities of different suppliers, 
which suggest a much smaller detriment. Section 5 briefly examines the CMA’s ‘indirect 
approach’, showing that adding inefficient cost to excess profit, which previous investigations 
have not done, greatly increases the size of the detriment. Section 6 summarises the findings and 
raises some questions about the future conduct of CMA investigations. Further background on the 
UK energy sector, and discussion of the CMA’s ‘indirect approach’, are available elsewhere.4 
2. Competition authority calculations of customer detriment 
 
2.1 Previous investigations that quantified customer detriment 
When a market is referred to it for investigation, the CMA is required to decide whether ‘any 
feature, or combination of features, of each relevant market prevents, restricts or distorts 
competition’. If so, this constitutes an Adverse Effect on Competition (AEC), and the CMA is 
required to decide whether to take or recommend action to remedy, mitigate or prevent any 
 
3 E.g. Littlechild (2014, 2016, 2017b, 2018b, 2020a); joint submissions with other former GB energy regulators to the 
CMA and Parliament e.g. Littlechild et al (2016 a,b, 2017); and views of other UK regulatory economists at a late 
stage of the CMA process (e.g. Yarrow 2015, Deller et al 2016). 
4 In an online version of this paper (Littlechild 2020b), Appendix 1 provides further background on the UK retail 
energy market, Ofgem’s regulatory policy, the CMA investigation and report, implementation of its remedies, and the 
Government tariff cap. Appendix 2 examines the CMA’s ‘indirect approach’, and also suggests that excess profit in 
the domestic sector was significantly lower than the CMA’s estimate. 
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detrimental effects on customers. Detrimental effects could be higher prices, lower quality, or less 
choice or innovation.  
The 2003 Guidelines developed by the CMA’s predecessor body the Competition Commission 
(CC) suggested that the CC would normally consider the effectiveness of competition by looking 
at five different types of indicators.5 The CC/CMA revised 2013 Guidelines discussed prices and 
profitability as well as some non-price indicators. These Guidelines noted that, as a benchmark 
against which to measure an AEC, “the CC uses the term ‘a well-functioning market’ in the sense, 
generally, of a market without the features causing the AEC, rather than to denote an idealized, 
perfectly competitive market”. (para 30) A “well-functioning market” is “one that displays the 
beneficial aspects of competition as set out in paragraphs 10 to 12” where paragraph 10 
summarised the concept of competition as a process of rivalry.6 Neither of the Guidelines 
suggested that an investigation was required to quantify any customer detriment, or had much more 
to say about how it might do this.    
There have now been 21 completed market investigations since the Enterprise Act 2002 made 
provision for them. In 10 cases the detriment was not explicitly quantified (though there were 
sometimes some hypothetical and partial calculations). In the other 11 cases, two types of method 
were used to quantify detriment: a comparison of observed prices against a conjectured and 
generally cost-based competitive benchmark price (what the CMA Energy investigation called the 
‘direct’ approach) and a more conventional accounting-based calculation of excess profit (what 
the same investigation called the ‘indirect approach’). In six of these latter 11 cases, both methods 
were used, in the other five just one or other method.7  
Table 1 shows the estimated annual detriments in the 11 cases where they were quantified. The 
competitive benchmark estimates are generally larger and less precise than the excess profit 
estimates. Excluding Energy, and the exceptional PPI investigation where it was said that PPI 
profits were used to cross-subsidise the provision of credit, all the detriments are in the tens or low 
hundreds of £m: the median detriment is £64m via excess profit and £92m via a competitive 
benchmark. In contrast, Energy found average annual detriments of £720m and £1400m via the 
two methods, and £2 bn in 2015, more than an order of magnitude greater than found in any other 
 
5 These were a) Prices and their adjustment over time, b) Profitability in relation to the cost of capital but perhaps 
looking also at the efficiency of costs, c) International price comparisons, and d) Other indicators such as innovation 
and efficiency. (paras 3.78 – 3.90) 
6 “10. Competition is a process of rivalry as firms seek to win customers’ business. It creates incentives for firms to 
meet the existing and future needs of customers as effectively and efficiently as possible—by cutting prices, increasing 
output, improving quality or variety, or introducing new and better products, often through innovation; supplying the 
products customers want rewards firms with a greater share of sales. Beneficial effects may also come from expansion 
by efficient firms and the entry into the market of new firms with innovative products, processes and business models, 
and the exit of less successful ones.” 
7 Sometimes a range of values was given. The estimates were often accompanied by comments about the difficulty of 
making such calculations, about the existence of other unquantifiable factors, and to the effect that detriments were 
‘at least’ of the cited amounts. In some reports, notably on Energy, large amounts of data were redacted [] so the 
calculations are often unclear. 
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report. The Energy detriment is between 20 and 67 times higher than in Groceries (joint second-
largest detriment in Table 1 excluding PPI). 





Market Investigation Estimated annual customer detriment  Detriment 




benchmark      (or 
Cost-based Method 
or Direct Approach) 
Excess profit                            
  (or Profitability-
based Method or 
Indirect Approach) 
2006 Store card credit services £65m - £90m £56m 8 – 13% 
2006 Domestic bulk liquefied 
petroleum gas (LPG) 
£[]m - £13m £4m - £[]m 3 – 11% 
2006 Home credit --- £75m 5% 
2008 Groceries £105m – £125m x29 --- Under ½%  
2009 Payment Protection 
Insurance (PPI) 
£200m £1400m n/a 
2011 Local bus services £115m – £305m £72m 2 – 7% 
2014 Aggregates, cement & 
ready-mix concrete 
[Cement] 
Cement £92m                               
---                                
Cement £30m
GGBS £15m-£20m 
4 – 13% 
2014  Private healthcare --- £155m – £174m  10% 
2014 Private motor insurance £110m --- 1% 
2015 Payday lending £48m – £85m  --- 4 – 8% 
2016 Energy  £1400m average    
£2000m in 2015 
£720m 4 ½ - 9% 
 
 
8 Source: Final Reports of the CC and CMA market investigations. Detriments as % of value of market are generally 
my rough estimates from material in the reports. 
9 The CMA estimated £105m-£125m at larger grocery stores, and conjectured a similar figure at mid-size stores 
(Groceries para 10.14). 
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Of course, the markets investigated were of different sizes, but the Energy detriment was large 
despite that. For example, the detriment estimates ranged from under ½% to about 13% of the 
value of the market. The preferred estimate of £1.4bn detriment in Energy represented 9% of the 
average residential bill (Final Report Table 2 para 195), which is a higher proportion of market 
value than other preferred estimates except for Private Healthcare at 10%.10 The Energy estimates 
were also high in relation to company profits.11 
2.2 Quantification using a competitive (cost-based) benchmark 
Of the eight previous investigations in Table 1 that attempted to calculate the customer detriment 
of an identified AEC by comparing actual prices with those that were estimated would obtain in a 
competitive market, four of them used rather detailed and situation-specific calculations that do 
not seem particularly relevant to Energy.12 Another investigation was overtaken by a Government 
decision to impose a price control, and a particular price reduction was assumed without much 
attempt to calculate what price would obtain in a well-functioning market.13 This leaves three 
market investigations as closer comparators to Energy. 
The Store Card Credit Services investigation found that there was insufficient competitive 
pressure on Annual Percentage Rates (APRs) charged by these stores. It estimated the customer 
detriment by comparing “the prices actually paid by cardholders with what prices would have been 
if they had reflected costs, including the cost of capital”.14  
 
10 Thus, in Store cards, LPG and Cement the CC preferred detriment estimates of 8%, 3% and 4%, respectively, to 
those of 13%, 11% and 13% respectively. In Energy, if the £1.4bn average detriment corresponded to 9%, the £2bn 
detriment in 2015 might be of the order of 13%, which exceeds that of Private Healthcare. 
11 The Groceries detriment at “approximately £105–£125m a year … represents around 3 per cent of the combined 
annual profits of £3.6 bn that the four largest grocery retailers earned in 2007”. (Groceries para 6.54) In contrast, in 
Energy, the average profit-based detriment of £720m was two thirds of the annual profits of the six largest energy 
suppliers (which averaged £1.1 bn over 2012-15 per Ofgem’s segregated accounts); the average cost-based detriment 
of £1.4 bn was one and a quarter times that same average annual profit; and the detriment of £2 bn in 2015 was almost 
precisely double the profit that year. 
12 Thus, Groceries drew on an econometric analysis finding that an additional store in the neighbourhood reduced 
average profit margins by 3.8% on average. This gave an average reduction in profits per store which, multiplied by 
the number of existing stores, gave an estimate of the detriment caused. PPI estimated the annual net deadweight 
welfare losses from people not buying PPI at (too) high prices and from buying credit at (too) low prices. Local Bus 
Services estimated the consumer surplus associated with an increased frequency of service. Private motor insurance 
estimated how much costs could be reduced if parties had more aligned incentives to minimise costs. 
13 The investigation of PayDay Lending had only just started when media criticism of the practice became so vocal 
that the Government announced that it was going to require the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) to impose a price 
control. The CMA and FCA liaised closely. The CMA’s calculation of detriment was based on a seemingly arbitrary 
reduction in the average monthly interest rate from 30% to 25%, and a month later the FCA announced its intention 
to impose a price control at essentially that level. The CMA accepted that about 160,000 customers would no longer 
be able to get payday loans, because they would no longer be profitable to serve, but considered that these customers 
would be prompted to seek debt advice, and “Apart from a short initial period we believe these customers will be 
better off not having taken out a loan”. (FCA para 1.27) 
14 It estimated that “in broad terms actual store card APRs were on average some 10 to 20 per cent above what they 
would have been had they reflected providers’ costs across the sector as a whole, including the cost of capital; thus 
average sector APRs have averaged some 26.5 per cent compared with our calculation for cost reflective APRs of 
some 22 to 24 per cent” (Store Card Credit Services, paras 9.10, 9.11). 
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The competition issue in Domestic Bulk LPG was limited customer switching between the four 
major suppliers, thus not dissimilar to that in Energy, albeit the market was much smaller.15 To 
estimate the customer detriment in terms of higher prices, the CC compared the prices actually 
charged by each supplier against the lowest non-introductory price that it charged.16  
In Cement, the CC found that coordination between the five major cement producers limited the 
extent of price competition. To estimate a competitive benchmark price of cement, it constructed 
a competitive industry supply curve based on the unit cost for each plant, assumed constant up to 
its level of present capacity. Then the intersection of this supply curve with the present level of 
demand yielded an estimated competitive market-clearing price (see next subsection). 
Three points might be made about these three studies. First, these three investigations generally 
express some reservations about the accuracy of their cost-based estimates of the price that would 
obtain in a well-functioning competitive market, and hence about the associated estimates of 
customer detriment. All of them seem to give greater weight to their alternative and lower profit-
based calculations of detriment.17  
Second, none of these three investigations challenged the efficiency and costs of the market 
participants. Those parameters were taken as given, and the question was whether a competitive 
market price would be lower as a result of a lower markup on cost, or a more efficient allocation 
of output between the parties. Similarly, none of them sought to augment the calculation of excess 
profit by adding in an estimate of inefficient cost. 
Third, none of these three markets was politically sensitive, and no remedial action was considered 
that was as invasive or as politically sensitive as a price cap. Nor was the presentation of the 
estimates of customer detriment such as to call into question the recommended remedies.  
 
15 LPG seems to have been the smallest market investigated – certainly it had the smallest estimated customer 
detriment - by an order of magnitude - in Table 1. LPG was used by fewer than 150,000 UK households in rural areas 
who did not have access to the mains gas grid. The rate of customer switching between LPG suppliers was low, even 
among customers who could obtain significant net savings by switching. Partly there was cost and inconvenience 
because changing supplier meant changing the fuel tank. But customers had little awareness of alternative suppliers. 
“Individual suppliers also charge different prices to different customers, largely unrelated to differences in cost. Low 
switching rates exist, despite the availability of lower prices from other suppliers and despite little evidence that 
customers have any loyalty towards, or preference for, the service of, their existing supplier” (LPG para 7). “… the 
major suppliers have made efforts to compete on non-price factors, but [we] found little evidence that customers 
perceive differences in quality of service between suppliers” (LPG para 9).  
16 “We began by identifying the lowest non-introductory price charged in Great Britain by each major supplier to a 
substantial number ([] per cent) of its customers in 2003. For each customer of the major suppliers, we calculated 
the premium (if any) paid above this price and multiplied this by the customer’s annual consumption in 2003.” (LPG 
para 4.80) The CMA main report did not give figures, instead commenting that “the cost to customers cannot be 
measured accurately”, and “alternative approaches lead to a range of figures”, although an Appendix mentions an 
upper figure of £13m.  
17 Thus, Store Card Credit Services estimates that customer detriment is “possibly significantly more” than the profit-
based estimate but generally cites the latter. LPG notes its cost-based estimate then says “but alternative approaches 
lead to a range of figures”. (para 4.80) Cement notes its cost-based calculation then qualifies with “However, we think 
that this estimate is likely to represent an overestimate of the customer detriment,…” (para 96) and referred to it as “a 
useful secondary point of reference”. 
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2.3 The CC’s cement market investigation 
The CC’s investigation in Cement shows how a different competition panel approached similar 
issues to those in Energy and in important respects took a significantly different approach.18 It also 
provides a simple graphical model for illustrating the two different calculations of customer 
detriment.  
The investigation covered the market for cement and related products. There were four main 
cement companies, plus some imports. The CC expected vigorous price competition.19 But it did 
not observe this: rather, it found “a combination of structural and conduct features in the GB 
cement markets that gave rise to an AEC in those markets through coordination … The likely 
effect of these features is higher prices of cement in GB than would otherwise be the case”. 
(Cement paras 4, 6, p 1) The CC used two approaches to estimate the extent of this.  
“Using the profitability-based approach, we estimate the annual customer detriment from high 
cement prices to be of the order of £30m per year on average for the period 2007 to 2012.” The 
average excess profit was £3.20 per ton. There was, however, great variation over time,20 and this 
approach likely yielded an underestimate.21  
Such accounting approaches have been subject to criticism by economists (e.g. Fisher and 
McGowan 1983), although defended by others (e.g. Long and Ravenscraft 1984), and the debate 
does not seem to have discouraged their use. In fact, Fisher (2002) made similar points in a short 
submission to the CC (2002) investigation into SME Banking, on behalf of one of the banks, 
explaining why high accounting rates of return did not necessarily imply monopoly profits, why 
real markets were not always in long-run equilibrium, and why profits had an important role in the 
 
18 The CC and CMA appoint a panel of about six members to conduct each case. The chairman of the CC Cement 
panel was Professor Martin Cave, who was later the dissenting member of the CMA Energy panel. One other member 
was on both panels. 
19 “In a well-functioning market, faced with a demand slump, significant excess capacity and high fixed costs, we 
would expect that market participants would compete vigorously on price to maintain volumes, resulting in greater 
volatility in shares and significant erosion of margins with returns at or below the cost of capital”. (Cement para 34) 
20 The CC calculated excess industry profit as the industry return (after impairment losses due to lower asset values as 
a result of the unexpected slump in demand in 2007) less a cost of capital of 10%, multiplied by capital employed. 
Over the period 2007-2012 the excess profit ranged from minus £41.5m to £78.6m with an average of £29.4m per 
year. Average excess profit per tonne varied from minus £4.00 to £9.00, with an average of £3.20. 
21 “We think that this [profitability-based] estimate underestimates the scale and significance of customer detriment 
in the future because the period that we have investigated includes a very severe and prolonged economic downturn 
and because our analysis did not cover a complete business cycle.” (Cement App 8.6 para 2) 
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process of competition over time.22 At the time, the CC seemed favourably disposed to this 
argument – provided it could still use a return equal to the cost of capital as its benchmark.23 
 
The second, cost-based, approach involved comparing average cement prices against a benchmark 
price that would prevail in a well-functioning market. This yielded “a total customer detriment of 
£92m in 2011. This is comparable with an estimated detriment of £78m in 2011 using the 
profitability-based approach.” There were of course qualifications here too,24 and the profitability-
based estimate was used as the baseline, albeit likely to be an underestimate over a full business 
cycle. 
Under the cost-based approach, the CC estimated a competitive benchmark price of cement by 
calculating a competitive industry supply curve based on an assumed unit cost for each plant. The 
CC argued that the price thus calculated, given the quantity demanded, would be the competitive 
market price in that particular year. It did not argue that such a price would be sustainable over 
time, or represented a long run equilibrium.  
Figure 1 reproduces (with some added numbers and labelling) a Figure from the CC Cement report 
to illustrate its cost-based approach.25 The CC constructed a short-run competitive supply curve 
by ranking the existing cement plants in order of increasing operating cost per tonne, assumed 
constant up to each plant’s level of capacity.26 Operating cost included the plant’s site fixed cost 
plus its variable cost and distribution cost. It excluded divisional and central fixed costs, 
depreciation and cost of capital, which were all considered sunk and irrelevant to the determination 
 
22 “6. … While it is true that in long-run competitive equilibrium, economic profits are zero and the economic rate of 
return (adjusted for risk) is equal to the risk-free interest rate, it is very much not the case that economic profits are 
generally zero in competitive industries. The pursuit and attainment of profits is the engine that drives the competitive 
economy. To use another metaphor, the “Invisible Hand” works through profits and losses. Only when (if ever) the 
“Invisible Hand” is finished working will economic profits be zero. Too often, economists are so fascinated by the 
beautiful properties of equilibrium, especially long-run competitive equilibrium, that they forget that real markets are 
not always in such a state. Profits play a major and useful role in competition.” (CC SME Banking 2002 p 109) 
23 “2.415. We also considered whether we should allow a margin above the cost of capital to reflect more general 
considerations of competition. It could, for example, be argued that competition not only is a force driving down costs 
to their most efficient level and prices to the minimum consistent with companies being able to finance themselves, 
but also has a more dynamic role through time. Thus, competition drives resources to their most efficient use, creating 
both pressure and incentives for companies to expand or contract production as determined by consumer preferences, 
and to innovate by investment in new products or processes. Profits play a role in this process by signalling where 
demand is rising or falling, where resources are most efficiently deployed etc; and by creating the incentives necessary 
to bring about appropriate resources. In essence, we accept this argument. We nonetheless regard returns equal to the 
cost of capital as an appropriate long-term benchmark for most or all of the suppliers in a market, and towards which 
fully effective competition would normally drive the market….” (CC SME Banking 2002 p109) 
24 “… we noted that our cost-based estimate is based on a single year’s data (2011) and that it is based on a model 
where, necessarily, we have had to make significant simplifying assumptions. On the other hand, we considered that 
the cost-based approach to estimating the detriment is less likely than the profitability-based approach to be affected 
by the point in the business cycle at which the analysis is carried out.” (CC Cement 2014, Appendix 8.6 p 1) 
25 Cement Appendix 8(6)-8, Figure 1. The CC’s Figure 1 shows only four representative plants labelled A, B, C, D, 
whereas in fact the four major producers had 14 plants in the UK. 
26 The CMA found some barriers to building new plant, but not to increased output of each existing plant within its 




of competitive output and market price. Demand for cement was taken as given and equal to 
realised demand in 2011. The CC then defined the competitive market price as the operating cost 
of the highest cost plant C required to meet demand (viz £69.50 per tonne). It measured the 
customer detriment in 2011 as the difference between actual market price then (£80 per tonne) and 
the calculated competitive market price (£69.50 per tonne), that is, around £10.50 per tonne, 
multiplied by the annual demand (8.78m tonnes), to give a total detriment of £92m. This area is 







Comparison of CC and CMA calculations of customer detriment: cement market












Cement companies argued against this benchmark.27 The CC conceded that it was a short-term 
concept and likely to be an overestimate of detriment.28 And the CC referred to this calculation as 
“a useful secondary point of reference”, relative to its preferred “baseline estimate” based on its 
profit calculation. 
 
27 For example, Lafarge said that price should reflect a Cournot equilibrium, with competitive price above cost rather 
than equal to it. Hanson said that the price did not allow some firms to recover total economic costs, including 
depreciation and a return on capital. Contrary to the CC’s Guidelines, the model was “highly theoretical and stylized, 
near to a world of perfect competition” (Cement para 71). 
28 The CC agreed that its model was not the only possible benchmark, and could be interpreted as a lower bound for 
the competitive price. It acknowledged that, “because the benchmark we use is based on a relatively short-term model 
of competition, some of the less efficient plants may not be able to recover costs of capital in equilibrium”. (Cement 
para 73) The CC admitted that “this estimate is likely to represent an overestimate of the customer detriment, because 
the model we use to derive this estimate is a relatively short-term model of competition which considers costs of 
capital as sunk, and because the model we use does not take into account the possibility of oligopoly competition.” 
(Cement Appendix A8.6 para 96) 
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One might wish to check a few details of the cost calculations to make sure they properly recover 
ongoing fixed costs.29 Subject to that, this seems a reasonable approach in principle, at least for 
the cement sector. And note that the CC makes no suggestion that it is surprising or unreasonable 
to find plants of different operating efficiencies coexisting at a point in time, or that the higher cost 
ones should be excluded in an estimation of the competitive price level. 
Looking ahead, the diagram may be used to contrast the CC’s calculation with that of the CMA in 
Energy. As explained in the next section, the CMA defined the competitive retail energy market 
price as (approximately) the operating cost of the lowest cost, most efficient supplier A, rather than 
that of the highest cost, least efficient supplier C. Thus, in terms of the labels on this diagram 
(inserted by the present author), the CC in Cement defined customer detriment as Overcharge, but 
the CMA in Energy defined it as Overcharge plus Producer surplus plus Inefficient cost. Not 
surprising, then, that there was a significant difference in the level of customer detriment. 
3 The CMA Energy market investigation: direct approach 
 
3.1 Constructing the benchmark 
The CMA found that weak customer response gave the six large suppliers market power which 
they used to engage in price discrimination and make excess profits. However, the CMA’s stance 
on price discrimination was ambiguous, arguably evasive and inconsistent (Littlechild 2020b 
Appendix 1.2). The CMA did not acknowledge that price discrimination could be an efficient 
means of sharing costs rather than of securing excess profit: that is, a ‘two-tier market’ with active 
customers paying marginal cost and less active customers sharing overhead costs could be the 
outcome of a competitive market. Nor did the CMA note that an extensive economic literature 
showed that price discrimination could be beneficial and a means of competing, or indeed that 
competition could force firms to discriminate. Yet while criticising the suppliers for price 
discrimination, the CMA found that Ofgem’s attempt to prevent discrimination had reduced 
competition and the CMA explained why it would not attempt that either.  
The focus of the CMA’s criticism is actually on excess prices and profits. The CMA explained 
how it estimated the detriment associated with weak customer response in the retail energy market. 
10.5 We have adopted two approaches to assessing the extent to which prices are excessive (i.e. have 
exceeded those we would expect in a well-functioning market):  
(a) A ‘direct’ approach, which involves comparing the average prices charged by the Six Large Energy Firms 
with a competitive benchmark price which is based on the prices charged by the most competitive suppliers, 
adjusted to allow for a normal return on capital and where appropriate for differences in suppliers’ size, rate 
of growth and the cost elements that are outside of their control.  
 
29 For example, by excluding depreciation did the operating cost nonetheless include the cost of bringing forward any 
future investment as a result of operating the plant in this period, and was the operating cost in the chosen year 
representative of a run of years? And if it was assumed that divisional and central fixed costs, depreciation and cost 
of capital would be recovered at other points of the business cycle, was there a danger that the competition authority 
would regard these subsequent prices and profit levels as too high? See Harris (2015, 2019) 
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(b) An indirect approach, which involves assessing both: (i) the Six Large Energy Firms’ levels of 
profitability (and in particular whether the return on capital employed by such suppliers exceeds their cost of 
capital); and (ii) the extent to which the Six Large Energy Firms have incurred overhead costs inefficiently 
(i.e. whether costs are higher than we estimate an efficient supplier would incur). (Final Report p 599.30)  
 
The present sections 3 and 4 consider the ‘direct’ approach, which corresponds to the CC’s cost-
based approach. Section 5 briefly considers the ‘indirect’ approach, summarising calculations that 
are set out in greater detail elsewhere (Littlechild 2020b Appendix 2). 
The direct approach did not involve comparing prices actually charged by the large suppliers 
versus those of other suppliers on a like for like basis (i.e. variable tariff v variable tariff and fixed 
tariff v fixed tariff). Rather, it involved comparing the average price charged by the large suppliers 
against the price assumed to be charged by “a hypothetical construct, a ‘supplier’ that is a 
combination of the suppliers that we have identified as being the most competitive in the markets”. 
(para 10.18) The CMA summarised its methodology in a number of steps.31 The benchmark was 
based on Ovo and First Utility, two of the four mid-tier suppliers, who in aggregate supplied around 
4-5% of the domestic energy market. The CMA excluded two other mid-tier suppliers that it 
considered were atypical.32 The calculations covered the period Q1 2012 to Q2 2015. 
The CMA then made various adjustments along the lines indicated. These were necessary because 
“the most competitive suppliers” were generally not earning a normal or even positive return on 
capital, were sometimes an order of magnitude smaller than the large suppliers, were often growing 
fast, and to differing extents were exempt from social and environmental charges that applied only 
to larger suppliers. The CMA calculated that, on average, the tariffs of the large suppliers were 
about 9% above the benchmark level. It concluded 
10.50 Average detriment is assessed at £1.4 bn a year over the period as a whole, with an upward trend, 
reaching almost £2 bn in 2015. Our view is that this may represent not simply a deterioration in competitive 
conditions over time but also an emerging revelation of the scale of detriment, as the larger Mid-tier Suppliers 
 
30 Unless otherwise obvious from the context, subsequent paragraph and page references are to the CMA Final Report. 
31 “10.19 … (a) First, we choose the suppliers that will provide the basis for our assessment of competitive benchmark 
prices. (b) We then consider whether an uplift is needed to their prices in order to generate revenue that would allow 
an energy supplier which has reached an efficient scale and is in steady state to earn a normal rate of return. (c) After 
that we adjust our data to account for exogenous cost differences between the suppliers arising from differences in 
their customer mix. (d) We then compute the average bill for each supplier by payment type and the benchmark 
average bill, and use those to calculate the extent to which suppliers’ bills are priced above the competitive level, as 
implied by the benchmark bills. (e) After that, we calculate the overall detriment to domestic customers from the prices 
being set by the Six Large Energy Firms above the competitive level. (f) Finally, we consider the robustness of our 
findings by performing the analysis of bills at different consumption levels and by comparing detriment estimates 
between dual and single fuel benchmarks.” 
32 Utility Warehouse acquired the majority of its customers via a deal with a large supplier, offers energy services 
bundled with telecoms, and acquires new customers from ‘partners’ rather than by advertising. Cooperative Energy, 
with about 1% of the market, “is a considerably smaller supplier than First Utility and Ovo Energy with indirect costs 
on a per customer basis which were significantly higher than those of Ovo Energy and First Utility …This suggests 
that it may not yet be operating at an efficient scale”. (para 10.25) 
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have begun to operate at scale and reposition their tariffs to be more competitive through the process of price 
discovery. Therefore we attach somewhat greater significance to the more recent results. 
The CMA acknowledged that its calculated customer detriment was similar to the annual profits 
of the six large suppliers, and explained that this reflected their inefficiency. This meant that, at 
the calculated competitive price, these suppliers would not merely lose their excess profits, they 
would actually make losses unless they could increase their efficiency.33 
3.2 Did the CMA’s benchmark comply with its Guidelines? 
Not surprisingly, the large suppliers challenged the CMA’s assumptions, adjustments and 
calculations. The CMA briefy summarised these challenges and how it accepted or rebutted 
them.34 Unfortunately, because the CMA’s precise calculations were either not set out or were 
redacted, they remain unknown and therefore not capable of properly informed appraisal and 
challenge.35 Oxera (2016), advising one of the large suppliers, argued that if the CMA had made 
what Oxera considered proper adjustments to the costs of the mid-tier suppliers, this could more 
than wipe out the alleged customer detriment.36  
The focus here is on the underlying principle of the benchmark. CMA Guidelines explain that the 
market may be judged against a benchmark of a “well-functioning market”, described as “one that 
displays the beneficial aspects of competition … but not an idealized perfectly competitive market. 
The benchmark will generally be the market envisioned without the features [that give rise to the 
adverse effect on competition]”. The Final Report cited this in the context of another adverse effect 
(absence of locational pricing for transmission losses, para 5.43 fn 22 p 192), but made no 
conscious attempt to consider what the competitive retail market would have looked like without 
weak customer response and with customers engaging ‘normally’. And the competitive conditions 
that the CMA specified were quite idealized.  
 
33 “10.114 We note also that detriment calculated under the direct approach is similar to the net profits earned by the 
Six Large Energy Firms from their sales to domestic customers from 2012 to 2014, but significantly higher than our 
estimate of excess profits from domestic sales over this period. The implication is that there is a material degree of 
inefficiency in current prices (i.e., if prices were to decline to the competitive level, the Six Large Energy Firms would 
need to reduce their cost bases substantially in order to make profits in line with their cost of capital).” (p 629) 
34 Final Report paras 10.67-10.80, pp 616-620. For a more extensive summary with references to suppliers’ 
submissions, and minimal answers from the CMA, see Final Report Appendix 9.11 Annex B. 
35 The Final Report including appendices has over 10,000 redaction signs. During the investigation there was limited 
availability of confidential data, in a monitored data room, and even then not to suppliers but only to their authorized 
advisers. 
36 Oxera estimated that the correct detriment figure could be anywhere between £0.7 bn (half of the CMA’s estimated 
£1.4 bn detriment) and minus £0.7 bn (implying that the large suppliers were actually more efficient than the entrants). 
The Final Report then made significant further adjustments after the data room closed, so that the final calculations 
could not be scrutinised by anyone and were not subject to consultation. These final adjustments were apparently not 
negligible: Oxera estimated that they were about £1 bn – in other words, of the same order of magnitude as the claimed 
detriment itself. But since the detail was redacted in the Final Report, literally no one other than the CMA panel knows 




“10.27 We have based our assessment on the principle that a competitive benchmark price in the domestic 
retail energy markets should fulfil the following criteria: (a) it should be reflective of the prices charged to 
active/engaged customers; (b) it should be reflective of the costs of an energy supplier which has reached an 
efficient scale (ie a large supplier) and which is in a steady state (ie the supplier that is neither growing nor 
shrinking rapidly); and (c) it should generate revenue that is consistent with a normal return (equivalent to 
an average EBIT margin of 1.25%).” (p 605) 
In consequence of this idealized benchmark, the adjustments that the CMA had to make to the 
actual costs of the comparator suppliers were very significant. The CMA ended up comparing 
actual prices of the six large suppliers with the CMA’s guess at what just two of the much smaller 
mid-tier suppliers would charge if they were not exempt from costly environmental obligations 
and if they had reached an efficient scale and if they were in a steady state and if they were not 
loss-making and if instead they were earning a normal return on capital.  
As noted, the CMA acknowledged that its benchmark price was “a hypothetical construct”, but 
how this hypothetical construct differed from “an idealized perfectly competitive market” was not 
explained. And if it was inappropriate for the CMA to use an idealized perfectly competitive 
market as a benchmark, why did not the same prohibition apply to the particular idealized 
hypothetical construct that the CMA did use? And how, finally, is the concept of “a competitive 
benchmark price” (singular) “in a steady state” to be reconciled with the insistence in the CMA 
Guidelines (para 10) that “competition is a process of rivalry”, involving “cutting prices, increasing 
output, improving quality or variety”, all of which imply differences between firms in efficiency, 
cost and price at any point in time, as well as differences and changes over time? 
3.3 Contrast with the CC’s approach to calculating detriment 
The contrast noted above with the CC’s investigation of the cement case stands out. Both 
investigations measured customer detriment as the difference between actual market price and a 
calculated competitive market price, multiplied by total demand. But whereas the CC defined the 
competitive market price as the unit cost of the least efficient plant required to meet capacity, the 
CMA defined the competitive price as the unit cost of the most efficient suppliers in the market. 
This must go a long way to explaining the differences in magnitude involved. The present 
subsection tries to assess the possible impact of this, and considers whether some intermediate 
position would have been more realistic.  
The CMA did not include a diagram illustrating its approach, but a variant of the CC cement 
diagram can be constructed. This is not straightforward because of the extensive redactions in the 
Final Report. However, Table 2 shows some Ofgem data on market shares and supplier indirect 
costs for the periods used in the CMA calculations, viz. 2012 – 2015 (Q2), and 2015 alone.37 The 
average indirect costs of the six large suppliers ranged from £60 to £90 per customer account 
 
37 Note that these indirect costs do not include wholesale, network and other costs, so they do not constitute final retail 
prices to customers. They include operating costs such as sales and marketing, bad debt costs, costs to serve, IT, HR, 
finance, property, staffing and billing and metering costs (including smart meter costs). The figures do not include 
depreciation, tax or a return on capital. 
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during the longer period, and from £73 to £116 in 2015. Based on various CMA comments, the 
average new entrant unit cost per customer account is assumed to be mid-way between the two 
lowest cost large suppliers, although strictly speaking this is the assumed cost of the two most 
efficient of the new entrants.38  
Figure 2 presents this data for the longer period 2012 – 2015(Q2) in a comparable format to the 
cement market in Figure 1. It shows the new entrants (in aggregate) and the six large suppliers. 
The horizontal axis shows the average size of each supplier during this period, in terms of number 
of customer accounts and percentage of total 50 m customer accounts.39 The vertical axis shows 
the suppliers’ average indirect cost per customer account.  
During the period 2012-15, the least efficient energy supplier was RWE with an average indirect 
cost of £90 per customer account. In contrast, the cost of the two most efficient new entrants is 
here assumed to have been about £62.50. The difference in the two bases of calculation amounts 
to (£90-£62.50) x 50m customer accounts = £1.375 bn per year – in other words, about the same 
as the CMA’s estimated average detriment of £1.4 bn.  
The picture is similar for the single year 2015, where RWE’s indirect cost was £116 compared to 
the entrants’ assumed cost of £72.50. This implies a difference of £2.175 bn, which slightly 
exceeds the CMA’s estimated detriment of £2 bn. 
 
 
Table 2 Retail energy market data40 
Supplier Market share  Average annual indirect 
cost per domestic 
customer account (£) 
Average domestic 
supply profit margin 
(EBIT as % of revenue) 





SSE 17% 15% 60 73 5.6% 6.3% 
Entrants 4% 11% 62.50 72.50   
 
38 The CMA indicated that its two chosen mid-tier suppliers were more efficient than the lower quartile of the six large 
suppliers but that at least one large supplier had lower indirect costs. (Para 10.98a) It also said that “Based on our 
analysis [of indirect cost ratios], Ovo Energy would be ranked joint first with SSE over the period under consideration, 
with Co-operative Energy ranking third, ahead of Centrica, E.ON, RWE and [].” (Appendix 9.11 para 27). The 
other two mid-tier suppliers were said to be higher cost. Little was (and is) known about the costs of the other smaller 
entrants. For simplicity, all entrants are shown in Fig 2 at the same efficient cost. 
39 20m dual fuel customers take both gas and electricity from the same supplier, 3m customers purchase gas and 
electricity from different suppliers and 5m customers purchase electricity only. 
40 Sources: Ofgem data portal and Segmental Accounts. Market share for 2012-2015(Q2) is shown at the mid-point, 
between Q3 and Q4 2013. The market shares shown are a rough average of the shares for electricity and gas.  
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SP 11% 10% 65 72 5.1% 5.7% 
EON 15% 14% 73 79 3.8% 4.4% 
Centrica 30% 29% 73 88 6.1% 7.1% 
EDF 11% 11% 89 88 -1.8% -0.7% 
RWE 12% 10% 90 116 1.8% -6.8% 
 
 
This is not to say that these indirect cost figures are the most appropriate basis for estimating 
competitive prices, or that the highest cost existing supplier would necessarily be the most 
appropriate basis for any calculation of detriment in the retail energy market. Rather, the point is 
that the choice of approach is evidently critical, and if the CMA had adopted the approach in CC 
Cement there would have been no detriment. This raises the question which, if either, of these 
particular approaches is appropriate. 
3.4 Which (if either) approach is more appropriate for the retail energy market? 
One argument might be as follows: The CC’s approach was appropriate for the cement market 
because, in that sector, it is reasonable to assume that each cement plant has a fixed production 
capacity and that new plants will have higher costs than existing plants because the most 
productive sources of raw materials will be accessed first. So competition will tend to drive prices 
towards the cost of the highest cost existing plant required to meet demand. In contrast, there is no 
obvious limit on the number of customers that can be served by any retail energy supplier, and 
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new entrant suppliers seem to be lower cost than most existing ones. Hence competition will again 
drive prices towards the cost of a new entrant supplier, but in this case this is approximately the 
lowest cost supplier in the market. So the CMA’s approach is more appropriate for the retail energy 
market. 
As regards the first part of this argument, there was not in fact a fixed capacity of production at 
each cement plant. Rather, this was an assumption by the CC that “excludes large step changes in 
cost associated with increasing capacity or bringing mothballed capacity back on stream” (Cement 
Appendix 8.6 para 26(b)). Nor were new cement plants necessarily higher cost than existing ones. 
Indeed, “the CC’s profitability analysis assumed that newer plants were more efficient” (Cement 
para 64) (although it was also implied that this was not the case for two particular older plants 
relative to a particular newer one).  
This suggests that the CC was not led to its chosen approach in Cement by technology and relative 
costs over the long run. Rather, it took the (reasonable) view that a short-run perspective on a 
competitive price, taking as given existing costs and capacities, was more relevant and appropriate 
for judging the competitiveness of the market, and more consistent with the CC’s Guidelines. 
The second part of the argument involves empirical propositions about capacities and costs in the 
retail energy market that deserve exploration. If true, they suggest that the CC Cement approach is 
not appropriate. But this does not necessarily mean that the CMA Energy approach is best. Is the 
distance from a potential long run position the most appropriate basis for assessing the 
competitiveness of the market at a particular point in time? Did the CMA’s benchmark in Energy 
reflect the levels of cost that might have been observed in a competitive retail energy market as it 
plausibly would have been in 2012-15, in the hypothesised absence of weak customer response? 
Or was it a characterisation of an idealized, perfectly competitive equilibrium, assuming that all 
customers considered this to be a homogenous product, and that one or a few firms could have 
supplied the whole market at the assumed efficient cost?  
Section 4 now explores in turn the concepts of weak customer response and product homogeneity, 
and the ability of firms to supply the market at efficient cost. It then looks at some calculations 
using arguably more realistic assumptions. 
4. Alternative models and calculations 
 
4.1 Weak and normal customer response 
The CMA concluded that there was “weak customer response” because many customers had not 
switched to the smaller lower price suppliers, even though the CMA considered that energy was a 
homogeneous product and that the smaller suppliers gave at least as good customer service. This 
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concept of weak customer response has been much debated, with a variety of complementary or 
competing explanations being proposed.41  
The CMA’s description of competition as a process of rivalry does not imply that customer 
reaction is immediate. Rather, since competition is a rivalrous discovery process over time it is to 
be expected that, at any point in time, some customers will not yet have discovered the better 
opportunities available.42 Kirzner (1973 ch 4, 1997 ch V) has argued that it is not sufficient simply 
to produce a cheaper or better product and assume that customers will realise this: it is necessary 
not only to inform but also to convince customers that this is the case.43 This remains a challenge 
for many entrants, albeit one that they are tackling, as explained further below. 
Whether it is appropriate to define a benchmark based on what a market would have been like if 
people were different is debateable. But if, for the sake of argument, one were to accept the CMA 
premise, that suppliers are able to price higher because customer response is weaker (or less 
informed) than it might be, this raises the question what would constitute “normal” or “reasonable” 
customer response? How to distinguish between a “genuine” preference for the existing supplier 
or aversion to another supplier, and an abnormally “weak” response to available market 
opportunities? And how much greater switching of supplier would have been normal? The CMA 
assumed, in effect, that the absence of weak customer response would be characterised by perfect 
knowledge and lack of preference for, or loyalty to, particular suppliers. This is implausible. But 
what might the CMA more reasonably have assumed?   
The compromise suggestion here is to consider as a possible benchmark the information that 
became available (ex post) as a result of the CMA’s recommendation that Ofgem should 
experiment with different ways of promoting greater customer engagement and switching. In a 
series of customer engagement trials known as collective switch (Ofgem 2019b), Ofgem required 
a number of large suppliers to offer to a sample of their long-standing (assumed disengaged) 
customers a collectively-negotiated “exclusive deal”, and gave considerable support to those 
customers that expressed interest in switching either to the proposed new supplier or to any other. 
 
41 Ofgem and the CMA have been much influenced by behavioural economics (Ofgem 2011, Littlechild 2016, 
Chisholm 2016, Walker 2017). Economists had previously explored this perspective (Ek and Söderholm 2008, 
Defeuilley 2009, Wilson and Waddams Price 2010, later Flores and Waddams Price 2018, He and Reiner 2018). 
Brennan (2007) and Yarrow (2015) suggested that some customers may have a preference not to choose. Littlechild 
(2018b) argued that the realistic opportunities for saving money by switching supplier were lower than the CMA 
suggested, that engagement was not less than for other products, and that the costs and risks of engagement or of other 
products were higher than appeared. Hortacsu et al (2017) find inertia greater for lower income neighbourhoods, 
though the difference declines over time. Mountain and Burns (2020) find that switchers save money compared to 
remainers, but the difference in bills is small compared to the savings available, and moreover this differs by size of 
retailer. Deller et al (2017) and Ros (2020) find that the evidence is consistent with customers making rational 
economic decisions. 
42 Thus, “when the variety of near-substitutes is great and rapidly changing, where it takes a long time to find out 
about the relative merits of the available alternatives, … the adjustment must be slow even if competition is strong 
and active”. (Hayek 1946 p 103) 
43 Similarly, in marketing, the “better mousetrap fallacy” is the mistaken belief that a superior product will 




Some 25% of these customers then switched supplier. By implication, the remaining 75% of 
customers preferred their own supplier, or at least preferred not to switch, even though they now 
knew there was a lower priced offer available. 
So, for the present exercise, assume that with “normal” or “reasonable” as opposed to “weak” 
customer response, 25% of the customers of the higher cost suppliers would have switched to 
lower cost suppliers. (This is not claimed to be an “ideal” or politically acceptable switching rate, 
simply one that, with the benefit of hindsight, might be argued to be more realistic than a 100% 
rate.) The remaining 75% of customers are assumed to prefer their present supplier, so the higher 
prices they pay are not to be taken as an indication of customer detriment due to weak customer 
response. The detriment applies only to those 25% of customers that would have switched had 
their response not been “weak”. This immediately cuts the potential magnitude of the customer 
detriment by 75%: from £1.4 bn to £350m for the 2012-15 period as a whole, and from £2 bn to 
£500m for 2015.  
4.2 Efficiency and potential output of the industry participants 
The next stage is to consider whether suppliers could have accommodated their initial customers 
plus these additional ones at the postulated “efficient cost”, or whether some other level of cost 
would be more plausible. The CMA Energy benchmark was an efficient cost that was apparently 
achieved only by two mid-tier suppliers, accounting together for under 4% of the total market (over 
that period), and also by one large supplier (SSE) with 17% of the market, hence a total of under 
21% of customers. The costs of other large suppliers and two other mid-tier suppliers were higher, 
and the costs of smaller new entrants were generally unknown (though in one case higher). 
Consider in turn the candidates for such expanded output at “efficient cost”.  
The six large suppliers had previously been able to supply, in aggregate, the 11% of the market 
that the entrants had taken from them by 2015, so could presumably have accommodated at least 
that many more customers now, albeit perhaps with some extra expenditure. But would they have 
been as efficient as the two mid-tier suppliers entrants were claimed to be?  
This seems unlikely. EDF, 84% owned by the French Government, and focused on getting support 
for building a new UK nuclear reactor, seemed impervious to its high retail costs and associated 
financial losses. The other large suppliers were privately owned companies subject to stock market 
pressures. Why would they have chosen to exercise market power in the form of inefficient costs 
and sometimes losses or borderline coverage of their cost of capital, if there was a straightforward 
way to reduce those costs?  
In fact, the large suppliers had already been actively seeking greater efficiency in order to compete 
effectively. In the early 2010s their priority was to unify and modernise their paper-based legacy 
IT and billing systems. Four of the large suppliers (and to a lesser extent a fifth) invested heavily 
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in adopting the system then considered to be the best available, namely the SAP system.44 In the 
event, the customisation and integration of these systems proved significantly more problematic, 
time-consuming and expensive than expected (especially for Centrica and RWE). In some cases it 
led to temporary failures in customer service and increases in customer complaints. In retrospect, 
it might be argued that these suppliers should have acted differently, but there was no obviously 
better system available at the time, and they learned only from experience about the problems and 
costs involved. Also, since it was precisely the threat of losing customers and the aim to gain new 
ones – that is, the strength of customer response not the weakness of it – that caused these suppliers 
to act as they did, it seems implausible that stronger customer response would have led or enabled 
these large suppliers to operate at the CMA’s assumed efficient costs.  
One large supplier (SSE) did not adopt the SAP system, thereby avoiding the significant cost and 
disruption of doing so. Table 2 suggests that, as of 2012-15, it had the lowest average indirect cost 
per customer. But this did not mean it was more efficient: as SSE explained to the CMA, its costs 
were unrepresentative because it had not yet invested in a new system.45 In consequence, it did not 
have an adequate IT and billing platform going forward. This limited its effectiveness (and was 
later cited by commentators as a reason why it needed to merge with another supplier that did have 
such a platform). So it is unlikely that SSE could have expanded its own customer numbers 
significantly, or even maintained its low cost with adequate customer service, had there been 
stronger customer response. 
What about the medium or mid-tier suppliers? The apparently most successful and efficient 
medium supplier, hailed by the CMA, was Ovo. It reported 171,000 customers in March 2014, 
which more than doubled to 408,000 customers by December 2014.  It was acclaimed as “the tenth 
fastest-growing private company in the UK”, so this growth was evidently exceptional. Its target 
was 1 m customers by end 2017, which it achieved. To do so, it invested heavily in IT and new 
technology. The picture is not entirely rosy, however. Ovo recently admitted systems and 
compliance failings going back to 2015, leading Ofgem to accept an £8.9m compliance payment, 
observing that “Ovo expanded rapidly, but did not adequately prepare for the demands of such an 
expansion.” The criticism was severe, suggesting that Ovo’s apparent low cost was at the expense 
of effiency, investment and regulatory compliance.46  
 
44 Systems Applications and Products, the name of the software as well as the German company that developed it. 
There is some discussion of investment in billing systems and software in Final Report Appendix 9.10 paras 49-57, 
albeit without the detail noted here. 
45 SSE told the CMA “that its indirect costs were materially reducing the … cost benchmarks used by the CMA [… 
because] it would expect to have lower indirect costs than other firms, since it was at a different point in its investment 
cycle for domestic customers.” (Appendix 9.11 para 12)  
46 “Ovo chose an IT system that did not contain functionality to produce documents that were mandatory and deferred 
the costs of full regulatory compliance.” (para 2.13) “Ovo admitted it was unable to produce final bills for its 
prepayment meter customers and that this functionality did not exist within its billing system.” (para 2.40) “Ovo could 
have invested more in policies, procedures and processes in respect of billing, annual statements and statements of 




The Final Report noted three other mid-tier suppliers (apart from Utilita that specialised in 
prepayment meter customers), namely First Utility (now Shell Energy), Utility Warehouse and 
Co-op Energy. The last was smaller than Ovo, and had significantly higher indirect costs, which 
the CMA attributed to not yet operating at an efficient scale. (para 10.25) It subsequently incurred 
financial losses and sold its customers to another supplier. What is remarkable about these three 
companies is that, on the one hand, they grew remarkably rapidly over the previous few years, then 
subsequently recorded no increase at all in market shares after 2014 (having, respectively, 3%, 2% 
and 1% of the total market according to Ofgem’s data portal). So is there reason to expect that they 
would have had, or could have coped with, significantly higher market shares had more customers 
been more engaged in the market? 
What about smaller (at the time) new entrants? During the early 2010s, improved and lower cost 
IT and billing and collection systems were being developed, geared to quick and small scale 
entry.47 These systems were popular and enabled a flurry of new entrants (83 from 2013-2019). 
However, the plausible extent of such growth was not obvious at the time of the CMA 
investigation. It is not clear that the entry or growth of these suppliers were hindered by weak 
customer response, or would or could have been significantly faster with more engaged customers, 
or that their systems could have coped with ms rather than thousands of customers. 
Moreover, the overall costs and efficiency of these smaller suppliers were and are unclear. The 
precise costs of many entrants are largely unknown, certainly in the detail that the large suppliers 
are obliged to provide. To various degrees they were exempt from various social, environmental 
and other regulatory obligations (including smart metering installation) that applied to large and 
medium suppliers, so were in effect cross-subsidised by the larger suppliers and their customers. 
Many small suppliers underestimated the costs and risks involved in the supply business. Almost 
all new suppliers have made financial losses over many years, and most are still doing so.48  
Some newer entrants have grown remarkably since the CMA investigation, notably Bulb and 
Octopus which have each taken about 5% of the market in five years and offer either a single 
variable tariff (Bulb) or a closely clustered range of tariffs (Octopus). Octopus has developed 
Kraken, a new cloud-based IT platform for interacting with customers and the industry, and has 
taken over nine smaller suppliers. Bulb and Octopus are each aiming at 100m customers 
 
Ovo’s lack of effective regulatory compliance mechanisms and generally poor attitude to compliance. Regulatory 
compliance was often disregarded or deprioritised in favour of other business activities. It was also not adequately 
factored in to Ovo’s growth plans.” (para 3.11) “It should also have been apparent that the continued deprioritising of 
issue rectification would ultimately result in breaches of licence conditions. We regard this behaviour as reckless.” 
Ofgem Penalty Notice 29 January 2020, para 4.18, preceding quote para 3.12. 
47 E.g. off-the-shelf or “supplier in a box” models that had been taken through Ofgem and other entry processes, that 
could be rented rather than purchased outright, and that increasingly also offered outsourced customer management 
services and related support infrastructure. 
48 The latest accounts for 33 small and medium suppliers collected at https://mikewhiskeytango.com/profit/ show that 
5 made an operating profit and 24 made an operating loss. The remaining 4 are failed businesses whose customers 
were rescued under the Supplier Of Last Resort (SOLR) arrangement.  
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internationally within the decade. To date, however, they have both run at significant financial 
deficits in order to grow.49 
At the same time, some established international energy companies (Engie and Vattenfall) have 
sold out of the market because of the strength of competition, and some 20 other small (and some 
medium) suppliers have gone bust, unable to sustain a profitable business in the face of lack of 
scale economies (and often inadequate business experience), fluctuating wholesale costs (which 
they had not adequately hedged) and fierce competition. Often, these exiting suppliers imposed 
costs on other larger suppliers (and their customers) as Ofgem put in place measures to protect the 
customers of failing businesses. 
Other events since the CMA investigation reveal how dramatically the competitive market 
discovery process is working. While three of the six large suppliers (Centrica, EDF and SP) seem 
to have focused on operating cost reductions, a fourth (SSE) has just been taken over by one of the 
CMA-identified efficient mid-tier suppliers (Ovo), which has also taken over another eight small 
suppliers. The fifth large supplier E.ON took over the sixth (RWE) and subsequently contracted 
to adopt Octopus’s Kraken platform, since when Octopus has entered an agreement to provide 
Kraken to Origin Energy in Australia. 
All this suggests that, even if the larger suppliers in 2016 were inefficient relative to the technology 
available four years later, the market was nonetheless extremely competitive, and is evolving in 
ways that could not have been forecast in any detail. But it does not suggest that the market was 
inefficient relative to the technology available at the time of the Final Report, nor that costs of 
then-existing companies would have been significantly lower if customers had been more engaged 
than they actually were.  
4.3 An alternative benchmark and calculation 
If the CMA’s cost benchmark was not plausible, what would a more appropriate benchmark have 
been, assuming a) that customers had exhibited a “normal” rather than “weak” response, and b) 
that the relevant technologies and costs were those obtaining before and during the period 2012-
15 rather than later, but also c) that there would have been some capability to increase the number 
of customers with the lower cost suppliers. 
All these are necessarily a matter of conjecture, but to give some indication of possible magnitude, 
suppose a) as suggested above, that “normal” customer response would have meant that 25% of 
the customers of the higher cost suppliers would have switched to lower cost existing suppliers, 
and b) that each lower cost supplier could and would have supplied up to 25% more customers in 
the relevant period, at its existing indirect cost per customer. 
The available data do not allow a calculation of what price would have established itself in a 
benchmark competitive market so defined. However, it is possible to estimate by how much the 
 
49 For the financial year ending March/April 2019, operating loss was £34m for Octopus, £128m for Bulb. 
22 
 
benchmark competitive cost would have been different from that assumed by the CMA, assuming 
it was set at the margin (as per the Cement case) for those customers that were mobile as between 
suppliers, rather than at a level equal to that of the two most efficient new entrants. 
Take first the period 2012-2015 as a whole, as summarised in the previous Table 2 and Figure 2. 
The above assumptions imply that a quarter of their customers would have left highest cost 
suppliers RWE and EDF, amounting to 6% of all customers in the market (= 25% x (12+11)%). 
Of these, 5% would have gone to SSE and  new entrants (reaching the limit of their assumed 
capacity), the other 1% to SP. It is assumed that SP could continue to take customers from E.ON 
and Centrica, but would not be able to take all those that would be willing to leave. So at the 
margin, the average annual indirect cost per customer would be that of E.ON and Centrica, jointly 
equal to £73. This compares with the CMA’s benchmark of the new entrant indirect cost per 
customer, assumed here to be £62.50. If what is argued here to be the more realistic benchmark 
cost had been chosen, the reduction in customer detriment from the CMA’s calculation, for the 
25% of customers assumed to be responsive, would have been £(73-62.50) x 50m x 0.25 = 
£131.25m. So the net customer detriment would be £(1.4 bn x 25%) - £131.25m = £218.75m. 
Applying the same calculation to the final year 2015, RWE, EDF and Centrica which had 50% of 
all customers in the market would have lost a quarter of these (12.5%) to the other four suppliers. 
At the margin, the average annual indirect cost was between EON at £79 and Centrica/EDF at £88, 
say midpoint £83.50. So the reduction in customer detriment compared to the CMA assumption is 
about £(83.50-72.50) x 50m x 0.25 = £137.50m, and the net customer detriment for this 25% of 
customers in 2015 would be £(2 bn x 25%) – £137.50m = £362.50m. 
These are very rough and illustrative calculations, and alternative assumptions would yield 
different answers.50 The main point remains, however. With more realistic assumptions about what 
a ‘well-functioning retail energy market’ might have looked like, the customer detriment according 
to the CMA’s direct approach would have been significantly lower, of the order of £200m rather 
than £1.4 bn for the period as a whole, and around £360m rather than £2 bn for 2015.  
5. The CMA’s indirect approach 
The preceding discussion has focused on the CMA’s ‘direct approach’. This section briefly 
examines the CMA’s ‘indirect approach’, which “involves assessing both: (i) the Six Large Energy 
Firms’ levels of profitability (and in particular whether the return on capital employed by such 
suppliers exceeds their cost of capital); and (ii) the extent to which the Six Large Energy Firms 
have incurred overhead costs inefficiently (ie whether costs are higher than we estimate an efficient 
supplier would incur)”. (para 2.164)  
 
50 It might also be argued that, with more customers, the lower cost firms would be able to spread their overheads to 




As regards (i), the CMA estimated that excess profit averaged £303m per year over the relatively 
long period 2007-14 and £650m per year over the shorter more recent period 2012-14. 
As regards (ii), it estimated an average inefficiency cost of either £420m or £850m per year over 
2007-2014, depending on whether the six large suppliers were benchmarked against their own 
lowest cost supplier or another (mid-tier) supplier.  
To estimate the price detriment to customers, the CMA simply added these two calculations 
together. Over the longer period 2007-14 this led to an average annual customer detriment of 
£723m (=£303m + £420m) or £1.153 bn (=£303m + £850m), depending on which efficiency 
benchmark was used. Over the shorter and later period 2012-14 the average detriment was £1.070 
bn (=£650m + £420m) or £1.5 bn (=£650m + £850m), again depending on the efficiency 
benchmark.  
The CMA concluded that “The fact that these two approaches, which are based on different data 
sets and methodologies, provide similar estimates, gives us confidence that our overall conclusions 
on the level of detriment are robust” (para 10.112). The CMA placed “greater weight on the results 
produced using the direct method.”  
The addition of inefficient costs to excess profit is basically a continuation and implication of the 
CMA’s assumption that the benchmark ‘well-functioning market’ should be characterised by all 
suppliers operating at or near efficient cost. The CMA itself noted that this made a significant 
difference to the overall calculation of detriment. For the longer period 2007-14, and using the 
more aggressive efficiency benchmark, inefficiency is nearly three times the size of excess profit 
(850/303) and hence accounts for three quarters of the detriment.  
However, this was a departure from standard practice. UK competition authorities have not 
routinely attempted to quantify the extent of inefficiency and its impact on market price, and then 
add such an adjustment to their estimate of excess profits (Littlechild 2020b, Appendix 2). Only 
two previous reports by the CC that predated market investigations did consider making such an 
adjustment, and both decided not to do so. The CC’s 2003 Guidelines briefly mentioned the 
possibility of comparing actual costs with efficient costs but the CC market investigations listed 
in Table 1 did not do so. The 2013 Guidelines note that low profitability may be concealing 
ineffective competition and that firms with low profits might be inefficient with higher costs. “In 
some cases, the CC may be able to compare actual costs with efficient costs when looking at the 
level of profitability achieved by firms but this may not always be practical.” (para 125) However, 
the centrality of a calculation of inefficient costs, and the addition of this to the calculated excess 
profit, is nowhere in the Guidelines. It seems unique to CMA Energy and its origins at Ofgem in 
2008 (Littlechild 2016). 
Thus, on the conventional CC aproach to calculating detriment, via excess profit without excess 
cost, as noted this averaged £303m per year over the longer period 2007-2014, and £650m over 
2012-2014. Even these are arguably an overestimate. Littlechild (2020b Appendix 2) explains that 
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the CMA assumed that a normal profit of 10% return on capital would imply an EBIT (Earnings 
Before Interest and Tax) margin of just over 1.9%. But the achieved return in the Industrial and 
Commercial market (regarded as very competitive) would imply an EBIT margin of 2.4% (after 
adjusting for the difference in risk). Against that latter more practical benchmark, the excess profit 
would reduce by nearly a half, from £303m to about £170m, over 2007-2014, and by a fifth, from 
£650m to £517.5m, over 2012-14.  
6. Conclusions 
The exceptionally high detriments (£1.4 bn or £2 bn) that the CMA identified in the retail energy 
sector do not indicate an exceptional lack of competition. Rather, they reflect a significantly 
different approach compared to previous UK competition authority investigations, in three main 
respects: first, the weight placed on “weak customer response” and the assumption that energy 
customers could and should have acted differently; second, the comparison against a hypothetical 
benchmark that effectively but implausibly assumes that, if only customers had been more 
engaged, all suppliers would have been as efficient as the most efficient suppliers then in the 
market; and third the augmentation of the conventional excess profit calculation by adding an 
element for inefficiency that, in one calculation, amounted to nearly three times the excess profit. 
More realistic (but still debateable) assumptions would have reduced the calculated detriments to 
fractions of the CMA’s estimated levels. 
 
The CMA’s remedies did not seem to match its finding of large customer detriment. The CMA 
had been warned about the implausibility of its stance but did not modify its position.51 Its 
calculation fuelled a media demand for introducing widespread price controls, either absolute or 
relative, even though the CMA had explicitly advised against such controls. Not surprisingly, 
politicians responded. Unless the price cap is regarded as having other uses (e.g. to enable 
otherwise illegal coordination of “fair” prices to higher-cost vulnerable customers), a significant 
challenge now is how to remove it. 
 
The CMA Energy approach thus seems inappropriate for future policy because it misrepresents 
the nature of competition (and of price differentials), and overstates the reasonable extent of market 
power and customer detriment. It thereby invites inappropriate and counter-productive 
government and regulatory intervention, some of which is already under consideration beyond the 
energy market. 
 
What other lessons might be learned? “Weak customer response” was surely the Achilles heel of 
this investigation. The investigation was launched at a time when the Government’s official Steer 
 
51 “Overall we find it surprising that the majority of the CMA panel does not feel that stronger interventions are 
justified if they believe their detriment estimates are robust. Either the CMA has substantially overestimated the 
detriment of non-engagement or the majority of the panel are being extremely optimistic about their ability to raise 
consumer engagement.” (Deller et al 2016 p 5) 
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said that the CMA should focus on this concept.52 The revision to the CC/CMA Guidelines had 
majored on this (Littlechild 2016). Fortunately, the next Steer from the next Government removed 
this guidance. The CMA could usefully consider further its own stance.53  
 
As regards the estimate of customer detriment, surely a CMA market investigation should not 
assume that in a ‘well functioning market’ all competitors would be as efficient as the most 
efficient competitor at the time of the market investigation. How is this different from the 
“idealized perfectly competitive market” that the Guidelines explicitly and rightly reject? What 
then becomes of the CMA’s stated belief in competition as a process taking place over time, which 
presumably means that some suppliers can be more efficient than others at any point in time, and 
that consumers are likely to face a range of prices? (And if a well-functioning competitive market 
is represented, not by the intersection of the market supply and demand curves, but by a price equal 
to, or near to, where the supply curve starts on the vertical axis, should the CMA start to rewrite 
the economics textbooks?) 
 
This investigation has highlighted the difficulties in estimating customer detriment by reference to 
an efficient cost benchmark. Assumptions can be made (e.g. that existing companies cannot 
expand capacity (as in Cement) or that they can serve the whole of the market at present average 
cost (as in Energy)), which may have varying degrees of plausibility in different cases. But even 
in competitive markets, firms will have different costs for many different reasons (e.g. because 
they have different products or customers with different costs to serve, or they may provide 
different levels of customer service, or investments are made at different times with different 
technologies available, etc). This suggests that previous competition authority investigations were 
right to be cautious about putting weight on such hypothetical “what-if” calculations of detriment 
rather than on more conventional calculations of excess profit (which, admittedly, have their 
limitations too). Moreover, previous investigations were right not to compromise their excess 
profit calculations by introducing conjectured excess costs.  
 
If, as the CMA professess, “competition is a process of rivalry” then an investigation needs to 
compare processes rather than equilibrium states. It needs to look at possible limitations on the 
competitive process. This suggests putting less weight on calculations of customer detriment at a 
moment in time. And more weight on conventional competition criteria such as barriers to entry 
or expansion or to customer switching, none of which seem to have been problematic in the Energy 
market. 
 
52 “Markets sometimes fail to work effectively not because of lack of competition but because consumers struggle to 
compare products or face costs of switching. The Government considers that these consumer behavioural issues should 
be central to the CMA’s analysis of whether markets are working well…” BIS, Competition  Regime, Response to 
Consultation on Statement of Strategic Priorities for the CMA, 1 October 2013.  
53 Should the CMA be so ready to accept the concept of weak customer response? Should it give it such prominence 
in its Guidelines? If a CMA investigation does claim weak customer response, would it be salutary to require it to 
spell out more explicitly what would constitute a ‘normal’ customer response rather than implicitly assume some sort 




There are also wider institutional questions. For example, is it appropriate to steer the CMA 
towards a “strong dialogue with sectoral regulators … to ensure that the overall competition regime 
is coordinated” – which in this case seems to have confirmed a mutual admiration for the concepts 
of weak customer response and “loyalty penalties”, and a focus on cost inefficiencies? Or would 
it be better instead to maintain and affirm the importance of an independently minded competition 
authority as a check on the enthusiasms of the sector regulators – and conversely? There are also, 
perhaps, questions about the creation, direction and politicisation of the CMA. But these lie beyond 
the scope of this paper.   
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Appendix 1 Background to the CMA report and implementation of remedies 
 
1.1 Privatisation, competition and regulation 1998 – 2014 
The UK natural gas and electricity sectors were privatised in 1986 and 1989, and the domestic 
markets (for residential customers) were opened to retail competition during 1997-1999. By 2008, 
after various mergers and takeovers, the 14 former regional incumbent retail electricity suppliers 
had consolidated into five national suppliers (E.ON, EDF, RWE, SP, SSE) and had taken 52% of 
retail gas customers.  The former national gas monopoly British Gas/Centrica, had lost this 52% 
of its domestic gas market but had taken 52% of the domestic electricity market. Dual fuel supply 
(taking both fuels from the same supplier) became increasingly common.54 There were several 
new entrant retail suppliers but initially few survived, never taking in total more than about ½% 
of the domestic market before 2008. However, there was active price competition between 
incumbents, with innovation in tariff structure and payment methods, and the annual switching 
rate rose from just over 15% of all customers in 2003 to 20% in 2008.55  
Energy prices increased sharply during the mid-2000s. This mainly reflected increased wholesale 
and network costs, but suggested to others that retail competition was not working. There were 
pressures on Ofgem to take action against the retail suppliers who, in the UK, are responsible for 
billing customers (in contrast to common practice in the US where the local network utility 
generally does so). All retail tariffs in the UK include all costs of supply.56 In particular, provision 
and reading of meters is the responsibility of the retail supplier.57 
Ofgem (2008) found that there were “unfair price differentials” because (inter alia) the five former 
incumbent suppliers were charging a higher price to their long-standing customers within their 
 
54 As of 31 January 2016, there were 28m domestic electricity customers and 23m domestic gas customers (gas not 
being available in some rural areas). 20m customers were dual fuel customers of a single supplier, 3m customers 
purchased electricity and gas from different suppliers, and 5m customers purchased electricity only. (Final Report 
para 8.101)  
55 In the UK and most other markets the term “switching rate” refers to the proportion of customers switching supplier 
over a period of time, typically a year. (In the US the term generally refers to the proportion of customers supplied by 
non-incumbents at a point in time.) Note also that “tariff” refers to a product and associated pricing structure, not 
limited to the concept of a tariff approved by a regulatory body, hence tariffs evolve constantly. 
56
 For 2012-2014, the annual revenue per domestic customer account of a large supplier was £578, comprising 
Wholesale costs 50%, Network costs (transmission and distribution) 23%, Indirect operating costs (including customer 
acquisition and retention via sales and marketing, metering and billing, revenue collection, customer handling and call 
centres, account closures, depreciation and amortisation) 13.5%, Environmental and social obligation costs 9%, 
Supplier pre-tax margin (EBIT) 4%, and Other direct costs of market participation (centralised data collection and 
transfer, switching programme, smart meter communications) 1%.  (Final Report, Appendix 9, Fig 8) 
57 At the time of the CMA investigation, only about 10% of domestic customers had smart electricity meters that could 
be remotely accessed (up to 32% as of Q3 2019). Suppliers encourage customers to submit their own readings, but 
estimated bills are common. (In evidence to the CMA, E.ON’s advisers said that “E.ON read its customers’ meters 
twice a year whereas SSE did this once every two years”.) Billing was traditionally quarterly, but now varies from 
monthly to six-monthly. A national domestic customer consumption profile (which specifies average usage in each 
half hour of the day, on each day of the year) is used as the basis for determining half-hourly usage from metered or 
estimated consumption figures, and hence for settlement between generators and suppliers. 
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former areas and a lower price to attract new customers outside those areas. It noted lower 
engagement by some customers, including vulnerable customers. It introduced a non-
discrimination condition on energy tariffs. Retail suppliers began to compete using a variety of 
other tariffs. Later, Ofgem restricted doorstep selling following allegations of mis-selling 
(although these complaints were not limited to energy). The switching rate began to fall. Not 
acknowledging the likely impact of its own policies, Ofgem’s Retail Market Review (RMR) 
blamed the fall in switching on tariff complexity and introduced a series of additional regulatory 
measures (“RMR rules”), notably limiting each supplier to a maximum of four “simple tariffs”. 
But the switching rate continued to fall, down to 10% by end 2012, and there were questions about 
Ofgem’s own policies.58 After considerable political debate, which included proposals for various 
measures including price caps, in 2014 Ofgem referred the energy market to the CMA for 
investigation. 
1.2 The CMA investigation and report 
Ofgem asked the CMA to investigate the wholesale and retail aspects of the electricity and gas 
sector, with two exceptions.59 Ofgem also specified five issues for particular examination, viz.  
incumbency, tacit coordination, vertical integration, barriers to entry and expansion, and “weak 
customer response”. 
The CMA is required to decide whether ‘any feature, or combination of features, of each relevant 
market prevents, restricts or distorts competition’. If so, this constitutes an Adverse Effect on 
Competition (AEC), and the CMA has to decide how to deal with it.  
The CMA reported in June 2016.60 It was a very thorough and substantial report (over 1400 pages 
plus over 50 appendices), diligent in data-gathering, organisation and presentation of material. It 
provides a valuable and insightful picture of the market, and made many constructive suggestions. 
As argued here, however, it had some limitations with respect to economic analysis of the retail 
market. 
The CMA found that the first four of the five issues that Ofgem had identified were not a problem. 
Nor were the wholesale electricity and gas markets. Moreover, in some aspects of the domestic 
retail market it found encouraging developments: in recent years there had been significant new 
entry, so that 34 suppliers now sold both electricity and gas to domestic customers. Entrants had 
increased their aggregate market share from under 1% in 2011 to around 13% in early 2016. Of 
these, four suppliers that the CMA called Mid-Tier (those with at least 250,000 customers hence 
 
58 Cf. Hviid and Waddams Price (2012), Pollitt and Haney (2014), Littlechild (2018b, 2019). 
59 Ofgem excluded the transmission and distribution networks, whose prices were regulated by Ofgem, and the retail 
market for large commercial and industrial customers, where Ofgem saw no cause for concern. 
60 CMA (2016), herein referred to as Final Report. Unless otherwise obvious from the context, paragraph and page 
references are to this Final Report. 
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at least 500,000 customer accounts) had about 9% of the market in aggregate and the remaining 
24 small suppliers had about 4% in aggregate.61  
Nonetheless, the CMA found ten AECs. Of the three most relevant to the present paper, the CMA 
found, first, that Ofgem’s regulatory interventions in the domestic retail market had not materially 
improved customer engagement, may have made some customers worse off, and had restricted 
rather than promoted competition.62 It recommended that Ofgem remove these restrictions. 
Second, the CMA found that certain technical constraints limited the number of tariffs that 
suppliers could offer to the 4m customers with prepayment meters (PPMs). It recommended a 
temporary price cap on tariffs for PPM customers, until smart metering removed those technical 
constraints.  
Third, the CMA agreed with Ofgem that “weak customer response” constituted an AEC in the 
domestic market. 
“160. Overall, our view is that the overarching feature of weak customer response gives suppliers a position 
of unilateral market power concerning their inactive customer base and that suppliers have the ability to 
exploit such a position through their pricing policies: through price discrimination by pricing their standard 
variable tariffs materially above a level that can be justified by cost differences from their non-standard 
tariffs; and/or by pricing above a level that is justified by the costs incurred in operating an efficient domestic 
retail supply business.”  (Final Report, p 39) 
To explain, Standard Variable Tariffs, or SVTs, which can be varied by the supplier at one month’s 
notice without any exit fee, were the norm before privatisation. Until 2008 they were one of the 
main bases on which competition took place, including by suppliers offering lower prices out of 
area (as noted above).63  
But Ofgem’s policies had increasingly restricted the scope for competition via SVTs, and by 2013 
suppliers were using non-standard tariffs as ‘customer acquisition tariffs’, particularly tariffs fixed 
for a defined period such as 12, 24 or 36 months, sometimes with a fee for early exit. Since about 
2014 such fixed tariffs have typically been lower-priced than SVTs, and are therefore generally 
 
61 Final Report para 108 p 24 plus Ofgem data portal. Most retail suppliers generally offered terms in most of the 14 
regional areas, so the number of suppliers available to any customer was nearly the same as the total number of 
suppliers in the national market. (Slightly fewer new entrant suppliers operate in Scotland where lower density 
increases metering costs and more areas are without access to the natural gas grid. A few local suppliers, often 
supported by municipal governments, entered the market after the time of the CMA investigation.) 
62
 “There are few, if any, signs that customer engagement is improving materially, either in terms of direct customer 
activity (e.g. switching, shopping around) or their experience and perception (e.g. views on tariff complexity). … 
[Suppliers withdrew] a number of tariffs and discounts and changing tariff structures, which may have made some 
customers worse off. … The RMR four-tariff rule limits the ability of suppliers to compete and innovate and provide 
products which may be beneficial to customers and competition. … [The RMR rules] dampen price competition by 
limiting the ability and incentives of suppliers to respond to competition by offering cheaper tariffs or discounts (which 
means that they, in turn, put less competitive pressure on their rivals).” CMA (2016, paras 171-175) 
63 There were also discounts for taking dual fuels and online billing, price guarantee tariffs, fixed price deals, wholesale 
price trackers, green tariffs, and various incentives for reducing energy consumption or taking other energy services 
(Ofgem 2008 pp 92-5). 
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chosen by those customers who switch supplier. (See Final Report Figure 2 p 25) In contrast, those 
customers that have never switched supplier are typically still on SVTs. In addition, SVTs are also 
“default tariffs” in the sense that, if a customer actively chooses a fixed period tariff but, at the end 
of that period, fails to choose another fixed tariff or a different supplier, then, by default, the 
customer is moved by its supplier to that supplier’s own SVT.   
Hence it is said that a “two-tier market” has evolved in the UK, as elsewhere. The CMA’s position 
on such price differentials was somewhat ambiguous.64 It showed little awareness of the extensive 
economic literature that price discrimination could extend the market or enable firms to survive, 
and indeed could reflect strong competition as well as market power.65 Yet it is not difficult to 
construct simple examples where a two-tier market and a “loyalty premium” do not imply 
exploitation of market power, and where the lower price is not “the competitive level” to which 
the CMA often referred.66 In these examples, encouraging disengaged customers to become active 
may benefit those who respond, but at the expense of remaining loyal customers, with no reduction 
in the “loyalty premium” in aggregate.67 In these respects, there are analogies with peak-load 
pricing.68 
Nevertheless, the CMA held that, because of their weak customer response, disengaged customers 
were on higher priced tariffs than they otherwise could have been. It estimated that the associated 
customer detriment averaged about £1.4 billion per year and was £2 billion in 2015. The CMA 
was also concerned that the extent of disengagement (and hence detriment) was not randomly 
 
64 Along with the criticism of price discrimination just cited were an acknowledgement that competition via 
introductory offers was common in other markets, criticism of Ofgem’s non-discrimination condition, and explanation 
why the CMA was not proposing a similar condition as a remedy here. 
65
 E.g. Baumol 2006, Borenstein 1985, Borts 1998, Brennan 1990, 2007, Klemperer 1987a, 1987b, 1995; for later 
discussion see also Armstrong and Vickers 2019, discussion and evidence in the electricity context, Hviid and 
Waddams Price 2012, Waddams Price and Zhu 2016 and more recently Simshauser and Whish-Wilson 2017, 
Simshauser 2018, 2020, Danias and Swales 2018, Littlechild 2020, Mountain and Burns 2020. Harris (2019) warns 
about the interaction between continued regulatory intervention, the “death spiral” (incumbent suppliers losing 
customers and having to increase prices to remaining customers in order to cover overhead costs), and the transition 
to net zero. 
66 Suppose a supplier has one million customers in its area, a constant marginal cost of £1000 per customer and an 
overhead (common) cost of £100m per year, then as a regulated monopoly it could charge a uniform price of £1100 
(= £1000 + £100m/1m) per customer. Suppose, with competition from similar firms, half its customers are ‘engaged’ 
and it is forced to reduce its price to them to £1000, while increasing its prices to the ‘loyal’ customers to £1200 (= 
£1000 + £100m/0.5m). The supplier is still just breaking even, there is no exploitation of market power. The apparent 
‘loyalty premium’ of £100m (=0.5m customers x £200) is just covering overhead cost. Hence £1000 is not “the 
competitive level” because total costs cannot be covered at that price. 
67 Continuing the previous example, suppose that half of the loyal customers are persuaded to become engaged, so 
they too now secure the lower price of £1000. They each save £200 but the overhead cost now has to be spread over 
half as many loyal customers, so the price to the latter increases to £1400. (Hence the possible “death spiral” just 
mentioned.) 
68 Thus, in a competitive market, the prices of electricity in the Day or Night will comprise the marginal operating 
cost in that period plus a contribution to marginal capital cost such that the sum of these two contributions equals 
marginal capital cost, where the levels of these contributions depend upon the levels and elasticities of demand. The 
lower price (typically at Night) is not “the competitive price”, the difference between the two prices is not a measure 
of monopoly power or exploitation, and encouraging Daytime users to reduce demand or be more elastic will increase 
the price paid by Nighttime users. 
34 
 
distributed across the customer population. Rather, “those who have low incomes, have low 
qualifications, are living in rented accommodation or who are above 65 are less likely to be 
engaged in the domestic retail energy markets.” (p. 33) Hence these more vulnerable customers 
were more likely to be on higher tariffs and suffering the identified detriment. 
To remedy this AEC, the CMA recommended that Ofgem experiment with different ways of 
promoting greater customer engagement and switching. This included setting up a Disengaged 
Customer Database which other suppliers could access for marketing purposes.  
The CMA considered whether to extend the coverage of the PPM price cap from nearly one sixth 
of GB domestic customers (those with PPMs) to about two thirds of all customers (those on SVTs 
or default tariffs). It decided not to do so because of the disadvantages of a wider price cap.69 
However, Professor Martin Cave, one of the five members of the CMA panel, dissented on this 
one particular issue, arguing briefly that the proposed customer engagement remedies did not go 
far enough, given the calculated level of detriment. 
“2. The harm which is presently inflicted on households in this market (£2 billion in 2015, or an average of 
£75 for every British household) is very severe, and in my opinion how far and how fast that harm is reduced 
is the key indicator of the success of the household market remedies. But the remedies proposed for the large 
majority of households will take some time to come into effect, and are in any case untried and untested.” (p. 
1415) 
Professor Cave said that, over the previous three years, a wide variety of information remedies and 
other measures had been tried but “had not made a dent” in the proportion of customers on standard 
variable tariffs. He therefore proposed to supplement the engagement remedies with a “non-
renewable price cap [on these tariffs] for a short period – say two years”, to remove a significant 
part of the 2015 detriment of £2 billion.  
1.3 Implementation of the CMA remedies and other measures 
Ofgem immediately removed the restrictions associated with its “simple tariffs” policy. The CMA 
itself implemented the price cap on PPM tariffs from April 2017. The CMA issued an Order 
requiring suppliers to provide Ofgem with consumption and contact details of disengaged 
customers in order to implement a Disengaged Customer Database. After concerns about data 
privacy issues Ofgem dropped it, with no comment from the CMA. Ofgem decided instead to 
focus on other customer engagement activities such as opt-in collective switching. It carried out a 
number of experiments in which samples of customers on SVTs were sent details of better offers 
available in the market, sometimes with further information and telephone assistance. It typically 
found significantly higher response rates than in control groups. 
 
69 “11.86 … attempting to control outcomes for the substantial majority of customers would – even during a 
transitional period – undermine the competitive process, potentially resulting in worse outcomes for customers in the 
long run. This risk might occur through a combination of reducing the incentives of customers to engage, reducing 
the incentives of suppliers to compete, and an increase in regulatory risk.” (p. 656) 
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Meanwhile, however, the Secretary of State for Energy had commented that £1.4 billion annual 
detriment to customers on SVTs “is clearly a huge amount of money” and wondered whether the 
CMA’s pro-switching recommendations were sufficient to deal with such a detriment. There was 
cross-party pressure for stronger action. John Penrose MP led a campaign for a relative price cap 
(to constrain the difference between each supplier’s highest and lowest tariff). Ofgem indicated 
that it would extend the PPM price cap to some vulnerable customers.  
In April 2017 the Prime Minister declared a general election, indicating an intention to deal with 
“rip-off energy tariffs”. Political parties proposed various severe measures.70 After the election, 
the same Secretary of State for Energy again pressed Ofgem to extend the price cap to all SVT 
customers. Ofgem (2017, pp 6,7) declared that there was a “two-tier energy market” and that 
“competition isn’t working well for consumers who are less active”. In February 2018 it extended 
the PPM tariff cap to customers on the Warm Home Discount scheme (which provides a discount 
for low income customers). However, Ofgem declined the Secretary of State’s suggestion to 
extend the cap to all SVT customers.71  
Accordingly, the Secretary of State, again citing the CMA’s calculated £1.4 billion customer 
detriment, introduced a Bill in Parliament to require Ofgem to “impose a cap on all standard 
variable and default rates”. A Parliamentary Committee endorsed the CMA calculation of 
detriment.72 The Domestic Gas and Electricity (Tariff Cap) Act of 19 July 2018, which received 
almost universal support, required Ofgem to impose such a cap as soon as practicable, and to 
review its level every six months. Ofgem introduced the cap in January 2019, commenting that it 
would save some 11m customers an average of £75 a year. (This cap also replaced Ofgem’s earlier 
cap on tariffs to Warm Home Discount customers.) The default tariff cap initially applies until at 
least the end of 2020, its existence must then be reviewed annually, and continues until 2023 unless 
the Secretary of State, in the light of a report from Ofgem, considers that the conditions for 
effective competition are now in place.  
There seem to have been other repercussions of the approach taken in the CMA energy 
investigation. For example, a complaint by a customer organization led the CMA to calculate a 
 
70 The Conservative Party manifesto promised a safeguard tariff cap to extend the PPM tariff protection to more 
customers on poor value tariffs. The Scottish National Party supported a price cap on SVTs. The Labour Party 
manifesto cited the £2 billion estimate of detriment and proposed an immediate price cap to keep dual fuel bills below 
£1000 per year (compared to an average bill of about £1280 in the CMA report), plus gradually taking the energy 
sector back into public ownership.  
71 Ofgem argued that “this kind of intervention – an intervention that will, frankly, have significant redistributional 
effects – is really a matter for Parliament”. Ofgem also pointed out that the large suppliers would “almost certainly” 
appeal such an Ofgem price cap proposal. This would take time, and the appeal would be to the CMA, a panel of 
which had already decided against a widespread price cap. 
72 “30. … In the absence of any appeal against the Competition and Markets Authority’s findings and after review of 
the Authority’s methodology, we were unconvinced by criticisms of the £1.4 billion annual customer detriment figure. 
We found no valid reason to question this figure.” House of Commons (2018), p 14. (The suppliers had not appealed 
against the CMA’s calculation of detriment, not because they accepted it, but because the CMA’s proposed remedies 
(apart from the dissenting view) were broadly acceptable to them. A colleague comments that the note of dissent in 
the CMA report, comprising 0.1% of the content, has had 99% of the impact of the report.) 
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“loyalty penalty” amounting to about £4 billion a year in five other markets, and to suggest that 
price caps should be considered there too.73 
 
Appendix 2 The CMA’s indirect approach 
2.1 Calculations in the indirect approach 
The CMA’s “indirect approach … involves assessing both: (i) the Six Large Energy Firms’ levels 
of profitability (and in particular whether the return on capital employed by such suppliers exceeds 
their cost of capital); and (ii) the extent to which the Six Large Energy Firms have incurred 
overhead costs inefficiently (ie whether costs are higher than we estimate an efficient supplier 
would incur)”. (para 2.164)  
As regards (i) profitability, the CMA estimated that excess profit averaged £303m per year over 
the relatively long period 2007-14. The sector made significant losses overall during 2007-9. For 
the more recent period 2012-14, the excess profit averaged £650m per year. 
As regards (ii) inefficient costs, the CMA first used as a benchmark the lower quartile indirect cost 
per customer of the large suppliers. (That is, it benchmarked these large suppliers against each 
other, not against smaller suppliers.) This gave an estimated average inefficiency cost of £420m 
per year over 2007-2014.74 If, instead, the benchmark were set on the basis of another (mid-tier) 
supplier then the average inefficiency cost increased to around £850m a year. (Final Report para 
10.101) The CMA does not seem to have made, or at least reported, separate average inefficiency 
costs for the more recent period 2012-14. 
In order to estimate the price detriment to customers, the CMA added these two calculations 
together, that is, “increased the level of profits in excess of the cost of capital earned by our 
measure of the inefficiency of each firm”. (para 10.102) Over the longer period 2007-14 this led 
to an average annual customer detriment of £723m (=£303m + £420m) or £1.153 billion (=£303m 
+ £850m), depending on which efficiency benchmark was used. Over the shorter and later period 
2012-14 the average detriment was £1.070 billion (=£650m + £420m) or £1.5 billion (=£650m + 
£850m), again depending on the efficiency benchmark.  
 
73 In September 2018 Citizens Advice submitted a “super-complaint” to the CMA, arguing that longstanding 
customers in five major markets – cash savings, mortgages, household insurance, mobile phone contracts and 
broadband – were being penalised by paying higher prices than new customers did: so-called loyalty premiums or 
penalties. And customers in vulnerable situations - older, lower income and less educated consumers – were more 
likely to face these loyalty penalties. In December 2018 the CMA endorsed these concerns and estimated that the 
loyalty penalty in these five markets could amount to about £4 billion a year. It recommended that suppliers should 
do all they can to enable their customers to get the best deal, but suggested also that targeted direct pricing interventions 
to limit price differences, or price caps, should be considered, as well as the possibility of changing the law to stop 
certain practices. https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/loyalty-penalty-super-complaint 
74 The suppliers argued that the out-performance of the lowest cost large suppliers should be offset against this, which 
would bring the total excess cost down from £420m to £290m, but the CMA resisted on the grounds that these suppliers 
were not particularly efficient when compared with the mid-tier suppliers. (para 10.100) Consideration of the issue 
using a diagram like Figure 2 suggests that the argument of the suppliers has merit. 
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These estimates of detriment are slightly lower than those given by the direct approach. However, 
the CMA concluded that “The fact that these two approaches, which are based on different data 
sets and methodologies, provide similar estimates, gives us confidence that our overall conclusions 
on the level of detriment are robust” (para 10.112). The CMA placed “greater weight on the results 
produced using the direct method.”75  
2.2 Is the CMA’s indirect approach conventional? 
The addition of inefficient costs to excess profit is basically a continuation and implication of the 
CMA’s assumption that the benchmark ‘well-functioning market’ should be characterised by all 
suppliers operating at or near efficient cost. As the CMA itself noted, this made a significant 
difference to the overall calculation of detriment.76 For the longer period 2007-14, and using the 
more aggressive efficiency benchmark, inefficiency is nearly three times the size of excess profit 
(850/303) and hence accounts for three quarters of the detriment. But the CMA seems to have felt 
little need to justify including inefficient costs. Is it therefore consistent with economic analysis 
and usual competition authority practice? 
There is no doubt that some large energy suppliers have higher costs than others, as Table 2 
indicates. But there are cost and efficiency differences in all real markets. There is also a basis in 
the economic literature, notably Liebenstein (1966) on X-efficiency, for arguing that a lack of 
competitive pressure can lead to lower efficiency. Scherer (1970 p 408) suggested that “the static 
inefficiency burden of monopoly does not appear to be overwhelming. But it is also not so slight 
that it can be ignored.” Early textbooks (e.g. Hay and Morris 1979) wondered what more specific 
inference should be drawn for competition policy? Competition and regulatory authorities might 
estimate (e.g.) whether a merger or restrictive agreements might impact on efficiency. And in the 
absence of competition, regulators in the UK and elsewhere customarily set network monopoly 
price caps set by observing differentials in cost and efficiency, and seeking to provide incentives 
to increase efficiency. But in assessing competitive markets, competition authorities do not seem 
to have routinely attempted to quantify the extent of inefficiency and its impact on market price, 
and then added such an adjustment to their estimate of excess profits. 
The market investigations listed in Table 1 did not add estimated inefficiency to excess profit. Two 
previous reports by the CC that predated market investigations did consider making such an 
adjustment. In Supermarkets the CC (2000) decided not to adjust its profit calculations because 
the inefficient companies in question made losses, so that shareholders rather than customers bore 
 
75 “… it has several advantages over the indirect approach, the principal of which is that it gives us a direct measure 
of customer detriment – prices are ultimately what matter to a customer, rather than a supplier’s level of profitability 
or cost efficiency. Further, the direct approach allows for a much more granular breakdown of detriment, not just by 
supplier but by customer type, including type of tariff and payment method.” (para 10.113) 
76 “A large part of the detriment we have observed in the form of high prices is likely due to inefficiency rather than 
excess profits, such that if we were to eliminate the entirety of the detriment we have observed through a price cap it 
would create substantial losses for the sector as a whole”. (para 11.90) 
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the consequences, and the effect of any adjustment on its profit calculation was minimal.77 Table 
2 above shows that one of the energy cost suppliers routinely incurred losses in the retail energy 
market (as did another supplier over an earlier longer period), but this did not seem to weigh with 
the CMA.  
In SME Banking, the CC (2002) initially considered that it should identify an efficient level of 
operating costs and add any excess cost to its estimate of profitability, and envisaged that the more 
efficient suppliers should be the benchmark rather than the least efficient supplier.78 This argument 
was not dissimilar to that of the CMA in Energy. However, on further consideration, the CC 
decided on cost-income benchmarks “significantly above” those that it initially suggested, and 
similar to those of the average of the four largest banks.79 There has been no suggestion that the 
CC erred in doing so. In a recent re-investigation of some SME banking issues (CMA 2016b), the 
question of cost efficiency and possible efficiency adjustments did not feature. 
The CC’s 2003 Guidelines briefly mentioned the possibility of comparing actual costs with 
efficient costs, and not looking at profits in isolation. The 2013 Guidelines note that low 
profitability may be concealing ineffective competition and that firms with low profits might be 
inefficient with higher costs. “In some cases, the CC may be able to compare actual costs with 
efficient costs when looking at the level of profitability achieved by firms but this may not always 
be practical.” (para 125) However, the centrality of a calculation of inefficient costs, and the 
 
77 “2.153. We also considered whether adjustments should be made to take account of any inefficiencies among the 
major parties. We found evidence that two of the major parties had higher costs than the other three (see paragraph 
10.18). In one case, this was explained by cost disadvantages, attributable to smaller stores and distribution costs. In 
the other, we estimated that there were potential annual cost savings to be made of some £150m. In both cases, there 
was clear evidence that profitability had suffered accordingly, so that shareholders rather than consumers were bearing 
the consequence. We considered whether industry profitability would have been significantly higher had these excess 
costs been eliminated, but found that the effect was minimal.” (Supermarkets 2000 p 43) 
78 “2.391. In general, if market power exists it is likely to result in excessive prices and profits. It may also, however, 
be reflected in higher costs than would be the case in a more competitive market structure. If this occurs it will reduce 
measured profitability, and attempts to establish whether charges are excessive by reference to actual profitability will 
underestimate the extent of any such excess profits. In principle, this suggests that we should seek to identify an 
efficient level of operating costs, and add to our estimate of long-term profitability any excess costs that might be 
identified.” (SME Banking) 
2.392. RBSG argued that the CC should adopt the least efficient comparator as the benchmark. In a competitive 
market, however, competition or the prospects of entry should act as an incentive to reduce costs towards those of the 
most efficient operators. The persistence of efficiency significantly below this level would be an indication of lack of 
full competition; and the notion that an entrant would be ready to enter provided it could match the efficiency of the 
least efficient incumbent is only tenable if the entrant believes there will be insufficient competition to threaten its 
position. Therefore, in assessing the scope for lower prices, we believe costs should be based on those of the more 
efficient suppliers.” (SME Banking 2002 Ch 2 p 99) 
79 The CC applied a cost-income adjustment to only one of the six major banks examined, explaining that this was “in 
order to allow for other factors that influence the ratios: we acknowledge that this is a generous approach, and that the 
scope for efficiency improvements may well prove significantly greater”. (2.397) 
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addition of this to the calculated excess profit, is nowhere in the Guidelines. It seems unique to 
CMA Energy and its origins at Ofgem.80  
2.3 The CMA’s calculation of excess profit 
The CC and CMA (before Energy) seem to have placed greater weight on their excess profit 
calculations than on their comparisons with a hypothetical cost-based benchmark. In assessing 
profitability in Energy, the CMA assumed that a normal profit would be a 10% return on capital. 
For the large suppliers’ business model it said that this would mean an EBIT (Earnings Before 
Interest and Tax) margin of just over 1.9%. On that basis, the CMA calculated that, in aggregate, 
the net revenues of the six Large suppliers exceeded a normal return by an average of £303m per 
year over the longer period 2007-2014, and by £650m from 2012-2014. 
As with its other calculations, the CMA made numerous significant assumptions and 
modifications, which were challenged by the suppliers. Again, this paper is not in a position to 
adjudicate. But even taken at face value, £303m is only one fifth of the cited £1.4 billion detriment, 
let alone £2 billion. It amounts to only £6 per customer account, about £12 on a dual fuel bill of 
around £1200 per year. A detriment of £650m is a little over double that. 
Even these figures might be challenged as reflecting an inconsistency in the CMA’s position. The 
CMA noted that the achieved average EBIT margin in the Industrial and Commercial (I&C) 
market was around 1.9%. (Presumably the equality with the normal domestic margin was a 
coincidence.) However, the CMA said that the I&C market was lower risk than the domestic 
market because wholesale prices were more directly passed through to I&C customers. Adjusting 
for this difference in risk, the CMA estimated that the I&C 1.9% margin would correspond to 
around 2.4% in the domestic market. (Final Report, Appendix 9.13 para 184)  
The significance of this is that Ofgem considered the I&C market so competitive as not to require 
investigation, and the CMA nowhere took issue with this. So if the 1.9% margin in the I&C market 
was considered acceptable, and consistent with effective competition, this implies that a margin of 
2.4%, rather than 1.9%, should be acceptable in the domestic market. 
Now average annual revenue in the domestic market was £26.5 billion (Final Report, Appendix 
9.13, Table 1), so a higher EBIT benchmark of 2.4% would reduce excess profit by about (2.4% - 
1.9% =) 0.5% x £26.5 billion = £132.5m. This would reduce the alleged excess profit over 2007-
2014 by nearly a half, from £303m to about £170m. It would reduce the excess profit over 2012-
2014 by a fifth, from £650m to £517.5m. 
Additional references for Appendices 1 and 2 
 
80 As with the estimate of weak customer response noted earlier, this focus can be traced back to the State of the 
Market Assessment Framework and the subsequent Assessment put together jointly by Ofgem, the OFT and the CMA 
(2013, 2014), which in turn reflect the approach of Ofgem (2008). (Littlechild (2015b) 
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